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In May 2014, Madden, Bohlin, Tran and Morey (Madden et al., 2014) published a study 
concerned with the mobile communications industry which concluded, as stated in the 
abstract, that ‘the probability of entry is enhanced by using auction assignments and excess 
licences’. They obtained the national 3G (third-generation)2 spectrum data which 
underpinned their study by recourse to the DotEcon Spectrum Awards Database 
supplemented by further data searches to establish the number of 2G licences3 held prior to 
the award of 3G (UMTS) licences. 
 
On the face of it, this follows established scholarly practice. However, it happens that several 
alternative databases exist on UMTS, of which one has been compiled by ourselves and has 
been used in a number of publications commencing with a book on the theme of 3G 
published in 2002 (Curwen, 2002a and 2002b; Curwen and Whalley, 2014b). This is 
compatible with Wikipedia4 (Wikipedia, 2016) and various publications of the Global mobile 
Suppliers Association. The problem is that even a cursory inspection of these databases 
reveals significant discrepancies compared to the data used in Madden et al., which suggests 
that the conclusions drawn by the Madden et al. article need to be treated with great caution. 
 
There are several issues to address, of which the most important relate to Table 2 in Madden 
et al. which lists the number of excess licences – number of UMTS licences less number of 
2G licences – and the number of new entrants resultant upon the issue of UMTS licences. 
Even if Denmark and Liechtenstein are set aside for the time being – the particular issues in 
those countries are discussed at a later point – there are numerous problems. In the case of 
Europe, for example, (and the list is merely illustrative): 
• Belgium: There were 3 incumbents and 4 licences. So Table 2 should read 
‘Excess licences 1; New entrants 0’, rather than ‘0’ and ‘0’. 
• Finland: There were 3 incumbents and 4 licences, all of which were won. So 
Table 2 should read ‘Excess licences 1; New entrants 1’, rather than ‘0’ and ‘0’. 
• Greece: There were 3 incumbents and 4 licences. So Table 2 should read 
‘Excess licences 1; New entrants 0’, rather than ‘0’ and ‘0’. 
• Ireland: There were 3 incumbents and 4 licences. So Table 2 should read 
‘Excess licences 1; New entrants 0’, rather than ‘0’ and ‘1’. 
• Italy: There were 4 incumbents and 5 licences. One incumbent withdrew 
during the bidding and two new entrants won licences. So Table 2 should read 
‘Excess licences 1; New entrants 2’, rather than ‘0’ and ‘0’. 
Some more detailed information about these cases can be seen in Table I. 
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Table I:  UMTS licensing  
Country 2G 
licences1 
UMTS 
licences 
available 
UMTS 
licences 
awarded 
Method2 
(BC =  
beauty contest) 
Date  UMTS licence winners3 
Belgium 3 4 3 Auction Feb 2001 KPN Mobile 3G, Mobistar, Proximus 
Finland 3 4 4 BC  Mar 1999 Radiolinja,  Sonera, Suomen 3G,  
Telia Finland 
Greece 3 4 3 Auction– assigned4 Jul 2001 CosmOTE, Panafon, Stet Hellas 
Ireland 3 4 3 BC – assigned Jun 20025 Hutchison 3G Ireland, mmO2, Vodafone  
Italy 4 5 5 BC + auction Nov 2000 H3G, IPSE 2000, TIM, Wind, Omnitel  
 
Notes: 
1. The number of 2G licences using GSM technology is that ruling at the time of UMTS licensing. 2. The determination 
of method is complicated in a number of cases. Some of these are commented on in the text but space does not allow for 
a full exposition. Other sources may accordingly give a different version. 3. Licensees are cited under the names used 
when the licence was first issued. 4. The initial intended licensing method was abandoned in favour of an assignment 
given the shortage of applicants. 5. The three licences were not awarded at the same time. Hutchison 3G Ireland received 
its licence in June 2002, mmO2 in August 2002 and Vodafone Ireland in September 2002. 
 
Source: Curwen (2002a)  
 
 
The problem also arises in Asian countries covered in Madden et al. (2014). For example: 
• Singapore: There were 3 incumbents and 4 licences. As only the three 
incumbents applied to bid the auction was cancelled. So Table 2 should read 
‘Excess licences 1; New entrants 0’, rather than ‘0’ and ‘0’. 
 
Table 2 in Madden et al. is notable for not indicating whether all of the incumbents either bid 
for, or won, licences. Furthermore it is not strictly accurate to state that there were two excess 
licences in Austria and Germany. In both cases twelve spectrum blocks were offered with 
applications restricted to either two or three blocks – in other words, an outcome involving 
either four, five or six licences was anticipated. This is by no means the same thing as two 
excess licences as claimed by Madden et al. and, in the face of sustained bidding by potential 
entrants, the inevitable outcome was that incumbents chose not to drive prices above 
unsustainable levels and opted for a six-licence solution. 
 
There are also comparability issues in Asia. For example, South Korea is cited as ‘Excess 
licences 0; New entrants 0’. What actually happened is that the three incumbents all formed 
bidding consortia because the cost of the licences was set at a very substantial $1.09 billion. 
The two (not three) W-CDMA – the equivalent of UMTS – licences were awarded in 
December 2000. However, the third licence requiring the use of an alternative cdma-2000 
technology was ignored by the third incumbent LG Telecom when offered in March 2001 and 
only awarded in August after LG Telecom agreed to become a minority partner in yet another 
consortium. 
 
There are two other significant matters to discuss. In the first place, Madden et al. state on 
p.279 that “only ‘contested’ (by incumbents and potential entrants) assignments are 
modelled”. By this they mean that any licences reserved exclusively for new entrants are not 
counted. As 52 assignments are listed in Table 2 but only 49 are modelled, there are evidently 
three exceptions. While this may appear to be a reasonable attempt to ensure data 
compatibility, it creates some ambiguities of its own.  
 
Take the case of the UK in 2000. According to Table 2 in Madden et al., there were no excess 
licences and no new entrants. However, the ‘A’ licence, reserved for new entrants, was itself 
heavily contested and sold for the extraordinary sum of £4.38 billion to TIW. Shortly 
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thereafter, TIW was sold to a subsidiary of Hutchison Whampoa which rapidly discovered 
that the only way to build market share was to act as a disruptive force by undercutting the 
four incumbents – a tactic also employed in other markets where Hutchison became a new 
entrant as discussed in Curwen and Whalley (2014a: chapter 4) and Whalley and Curwen 
(2012). In other words, new entry was a significant factor in the post-auction structure of the 
UK market. 
 
Secondly, Madden et al. state in Table 3 that the 49 assignments in their sample can be 
readily divided into 20 auctions and 29 beauty contests. However, this is misleading. For 
example, in the case of Liechtenstein the regulator used neither system of assignment but 
rather offered the licences to incumbents without a fee. It was over a year later before the first 
acceptance was formally registered and one incumbent refused outright. In the case of 
France, the so-called beauty contest was in name only because a minimum licence fee was set 
at roughly €5 billion – rather more in practice than could have been expected via an auction – 
with the result that only two of the three incumbents and no potential new entrants applied.  
 
In the case of Denmark, a single round sealed-bid tender was used rather than a multi-round 
auction which again was significant because one of the incumbents chose not to bid, one part-
owner of another incumbent also chose not to bid leaving the other owner to bid on alone 
(thereby raising the issue as to whether it was technically an incumbent or a new entrant), and 
one incumbent was outbid by a new entrant (Hutchison Whampoa). Furthermore, a number 
of auctions were preceded by stringent beauty contests – these are known as ‘hybrid’ auctions 
– with a view to eliminating parties with no real interest in winning a licence5, while in 
Slovenia in March 2001, the price bid was not the only factor specified in determining who 
would be awarded an auctioned licence.  
 
In summary, it is evident that there two issues to address. Firstly, it is necessary to consider 
whether the Madden et al. article is factually accurate. According to the sources cited that 
they failed to consult, there do appear to be a significant number of factual inaccuracies. 
Secondly, and just as importantly, it is necessary to consider whether the entries as stated 
without any qualification are acceptable as they stand. As indicated above, many of the 
UMTS licence sales were far from straightforward but Madden et al. appear to have chosen to 
brush under the carpet the problem of comparing like with like.  
 
All of this matters because, having established their database, Madden et al. subject the data 
to complex and extensive econometric analysis which occupies 14 of the 20 pages of text in 
their article. But if the database is inaccurate, no amount of econometrics can make it more 
accurate. It just means that the conclusions drawn will themselves be inaccurate, in which 
case there seems to be little point in conducting the analysis in the first place. 
  
 
Notes 
1. The editor of the Review of Industrial Organization has refused to publish this on more than one occasion, in 
effect claiming that we have not ‘proved’ that Madden et al. have made any errors. 
2. This is most commonly known as the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS). 
3. This is most commonly known as the Global System for Mobile (GSM). In Europe it operates in the 900 
MHz and 1800 MHz bands, whereas UMTS operates in the 2.1 GHz band.  
4. Although Wikipedia is often treated with disdain by academics, its telecoms databases can be surprisingly 
detailed and accurate. 
5. A concern, for example, was that certain bidders would attempt to drive up prices before pulling out. 
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